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Abstract—Modern vehicles are complex safety critical cyber
physical systems, that are connected to the outside world, with
all security implications that brings. To enhance vehicle security
several network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) have been
proposed for the CAN bus, the predominant type of in-vehicle
network. The in-vehicle CAN bus, however, is a challenging
place to do intrusion detection as messages provide very little
information; interpreting them requires specific knowledge about
the implementation that is not readily available. In this technical
report we collect how existing solutions address this challenge by
providing an organized inventory of various CAN NIDSs present
in the literature, categorizing them based on what information
they extract from the network and how they build their model.
Index Terms—In-vehicle networks, CAN bus, intrusion detec-
tion, car hacking
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicles are becoming more intelligent, offering increasing
numbers of innovative applications covering different function-
alities ranging from vehicle control to telematics and advanced
driver assistance systems. To achieve this they implement
more than a 100 million lines of code, running on micro
controllers (called electronic control units, ECUs) spread over
the entire vehicle and they are connected to the outside world;
to personal devices, to VANETs and the Internet. In short, a
modern vehicle is a complex cyber physical network rather
than purely a mechanical device.
The increased connectivity and many functionalities, while
offering many benefits, also come with evident security risks.
The vehicle complexity offers a large attack surface. Re-
searchers have already demonstrated the ability to remotely
take over the control of diverse vehicles at speed [1]–[4]. Such
(Remote) attacks could have life threatening consequences.
Implementing security measures in a safety critical complex
cyber physical network is difficult as one has to guarantee
the security measures do not impact the existing functionality.
Invasive solutions that could impact availability of safety
critical functions or require a major redesign of the vehicle
or its components will not be acceptable to the manufacturer.
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) provide a non-
invasive security measure that is well-established in other
fields (general IT, ICS). But how well do such approaches
translate to the automotive setting? In literature we find a
number of NIDS proposals for the predominant type of in-
vehicle network: the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus [5]–
[25] that address of the particularities of this environment in
different ways.
In this technical report we provide an organized inventory
of present CAN NIDs proposals, categorizing them using
dimensions suitable for the in-vehicle CAN bus setting.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: after
treating the CAN protocol, known attacks on CAN and NIDS
in general in Section II-A we address the threat landscape
in Section III. Next we survey existing in-vehicle NIDS in
Section IV.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we provide the background information rel-
evant to our study. We first give an overview of the Controller
Area Network (CAN) protocol, followed by the CAN bus
attacks published, and finally we cover some basic terminology
regarding NIDS.
A. Controller Area Network
CAN is a message-oriented transmission protocol proposed
by Robert Bosch in 1986. It was originally designed for
the automotive industry, in an attempt to reduce the wiring
complexity of automobiles [26]. Due to its low cost, sim-
plicity, deterministic resolution of contention and resilience
to electromagnetic interference, CAN is today not only the
de facto standard protocol for in-vehicle communications, but
also widely used in hospitals, factories and plant controls [27].
CAN is a multicast communication protocol, based on a
multi-master access scheme [28]. In the automotive context,
the Electronic Control Units (ECU) broadcast their CAN
frames onto the bus. There is no addressing scheme with
CAN: each frame is assigned a unique identifier, known as the
“arbitration ID” or “CAN ID”, which defines both the content
and the priority of the frame. With 11 bits in the identifier
field, the CAN ID can range from 0x000 to 0x7FF.
CAN frames are composed of several fields, as depicted in
Fig. 1. According to the CAN specifications, four different
types of frame are used to control message transfers on the
bus [29]. Data frames (RTR=0) are typically used to carry up
to 8 bytes of data sent by an ECU. Moreover a node on the
bus can also send a remote frame (RTR=1, 0 bit data field) to
request information from another one.
Overload frames (specified in the control field) can request
an extra delay between two data or remote frames.
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Finally, any node on the bus can invalidate a frame being
sent by sending an error frame, when it detects a problem
with it.
While an ECU may broadcast multiple CAN IDs, each CAN
ID is bound to a single ECU;
two ECUs cannot send data frames with the same CAN ID.
Every time a frame is transmitted, all ECUs on the bus will
receive it, and will determine, based on the CAN ID whether
they should accept and further process the message [30].
In the automotive context, vendors rely on higher level
protocols on top of CAN to define the format of the CAN
frames’ payload. Generally speaking, they use two types of
data frames: normal messages and diagnostic messages [2].
Normal messages follow a proprietary format and are the ones
transmitted by the ECUs during regular operations. Diagnostic
messages are defined according to a diagnostic communication
protocol such as Unified Diagnostic Services (ISO 14229-1):
they are special messages normally sent by mechanic’s tool
(or “tester”) during maintenance operations. Depending on the
services implemented on an ECU, diagnostic messages can be
used to perform various actions such as querying information
or updating its firmware.
Fig. 1: CAN frame structure
The CAN protocol offers a robust arbitration mechanism
that handles the conflict when two or more nodes try to
transmit a frame at the same time. As previously mentioned,
the CAN ID of a frame determines its priority: the lower
the ID value, the higher its priority. Consequently the ECU
sending the frame with the lowest CAN ID value wins the
arbitration and has access to the bus. The other ECUs wanting
to transmit data wait until the bus is free before trying again.
The advantage of the arbitration mechanism is twofold: it
guarantees that neither information nor time is lost [29] and
that eventually all ECUs can have access to the bus [31].
Additionally CAN includes a fault confinement mechanism
which removes faulty ECUs from the bus. A node can be
in one of these three states: error active when functioning
properly, error passive when suspected of faulty behavior, or
bus off when considered corrupted [27]. When too many errors
are detected, ECUs will change state and ultimately disconnect
themselves from the network [30].
This mechanism protects the health of the bus by preventing
faulty ECUs from disturbing communications or impacting
network performance [28].
The CAN protocol and its application has a few impor-
tant security implications. First of all, car makers deploy
the reliable CAN protocol on high-speed buses inside their
vehicles to interconnect safety-critical ECUs. However, its
simplicity implies that many common security measures such
as communication encryption or ECU authentication are not
possible. In addition, the broadcasting nature of the protocol
allows anyone on the bus to read and send messages, which
can have critical consequences as explained in the next section.
B. CAN bus attacks
As demonstrated in previous research [1], [2], [4], [32],
an attacker has a board range of entry points which can
be leveraged to gain access to the CAN bus. Due to the
nature of CAN communications (unencrypted and broadcast
communications) an attacker can perform various actions once
she gained access to the bus. The attacker can start with some
sort of initial reconnaissance by listening to the messages
sent onto the bus and performing a fuzzing attack by sending
messages with random CAN IDs and payload values and
observing the reaction. This attack can allow an attacker to
learn about the architecture and the behavior of the vehicle
and its ECUs.
As demonstrated in [2], an attacker can also send a diag-
nostic message in order to open a diagnostic session on an
ECU, allowing her to perform specific actions, depending on
the services implemented on that ECU. Diagnostic messages
are extremely powerful. They are, for example, leveraged by
Miller and Valasek in [33] to perform various actions on a
Toyota Prius and a Ford Escape.
The attacker can try to influence an ECU by crafting
frames with the CAN ID and payload of his choice. With
sufficient knowledge about the payload, the attacker can craft
CAN frames in such way that the receiving ECU will behave
according to the attacker’s wishes. She can for instance make
the instrument cluster display an arbitrary speed or steer the
wheels in a given direction.
If the attacker aims to prevent ECUs from communicating,
a straightforward Denial of Service (DOS) attack consists in
flooding the bus with frames with the CAN ID set to 0x000. As
the CAN ID of a frame determines its priority as mentioned
in Section II-A, repeatedly sending messages with CAN ID
0x000 (i.e. the highest priority) will prevent the other ECUs
from transmitting their frames. Such an attack can put the car
in an unstable state [33].
There are also low level attacks relying on bus signal
tempering, as demonstrated in [34], and researchers have been
able to conduct bus-off attacks on diverse vehicles [35]–[37].
Unlike the attacks discussed previously, they do not require
sending entire frames onto the bus. An attacker can abuse the
error handling mechanism of the CAN protocol by sending a
few bits at the same time the targeted ECU is transmitting
a frame onto the bus. Consequently the corruption of the
message will trigger the fault confinement mechanism of CAN.
After a certain number of errors, the targeted ECU will be put
in “bus off” mode, preventing it from sending new frames.
The attacker can then freely send her CAN frames, posing as
the silenced ECU. As these papers explain, these attacks are
not detectable by current frame-based NIDS since they do not
involve injecting whole CAN frames.
C. Network Intrusion Detection Systems
In this section, we cover some background information
about Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) and
their typical attributes used to categorize them, namely their
detection method and depth of inspection. Finally we will
introduce performance metrics to evaluate these systems.
1) Detection method: There are two main methods used
to detect intrusions: knowledge-based and anomaly-based de-
tection. The later method also encompasses another variant,
referred to as specification-based detection. In this section we
introduce these three methods.
Knowledge-based: Also known as signature-based or mis-
use detection, a knowledge-based NIDS uses information
about attacks, so-called signatures, as a pattern characterizing a
known threat [38], [39]. The NIDS will compare the signatures
against observed events to identify possible attacks [40]. Upon
detection (i.e. an event matches a signature) a action can be
executed, typically an alarm will be raised (ideally notifying
the network administrator or the security team) and a counter-
measure can be initiated (e.g. termination of the connection)
depending on the rule specified for a given attack.
With their black-list approach, knowledge-based NIDS are
effective to detect known threats with great accuracy. They
generally present a very low rate of false positives since the
use of signatures guarantees that each match signifies that
a malicious event has been successfully detected. Although,
since the set of signatures cannot be exhaustive, such NIDS
are unable to catch unknown threats: hackers will find new
vulnerabilities to exploit before a signature can be created
to detect their attacks (so-called zero day). Moreover, some
techniques can be employed in order to bypass knowledge-
based detection systems [41], such as payload encoding.
Anomaly-based: An anomaly-based NIDS first creates a
reference model (or “profile”) of a system by recording and
collecting normal/legitimate operations and communications.
Then it starts monitoring the current activities of that system.
An alert will be generated anytime the NIDS identifies a
significant deviation from the model [42]. Building such
profiles can be done more or less autonomously using a sample
of historical data or even diverse machine learning techniques
[43]–[45].
Put simply, anything that does not happen according to the
normal behavior previously learned is regarded as an incident.
The main advantage of the anomaly-based IDS is twofold:
there is no overhead of maintaining a signature database up
to date, and they provide the capability to detect unforeseen
attacks. Any attack would (in theory) change the normal
behavior of a system by, for instance, accessing unusual re-
sources or establishing connections with new machines outside
of the trusted network. However this capability comes with
the price of false positives: these NIDS are prone to detect
legitimate events as malicious if they have not been previously
observed during the learning phase [40]. The quality of the
model created will influence the risk of false positives. It is
very challenging to build accurate profiles because systems’
activities are usually quite complex.
Specification-based: In the same fashion as anomaly-based
detection, specification-based (or “anomaly-specification-
based”) NIDS detect attacks by identifying deviations from
a norm [46]. But instead of creating the reference model
during an initial learning phase, specifications of a system
are manually developed to characterize legitimate program
behaviors [47].
Compared to anomaly-based NIDS, the main benefit of this
approach is its accuracy in distinguishing legitimate deviations
from the malicious ones. If the profile is correctly developed,
based on the system’s specifications, “the false positive rate
can be comparable to that of knowledge-based detection”
[47]. As a matter of fact, since the model is developed
manually, it will be more exhaustive than the model created
during a definite learning phase. However depending on the
system, it can be challenging to retrieve the complete set of
specifications.
2) Depth of inspection: We can distinguished two different
levels of depth of inspection. In a flow-based approach, a NIDS
will look at a collection of packets presenting certain common
characteristics. The second approach, referred as payload-
based (or “packet-based”), a NIDS will analyze the payload
of each packet passing on the network. We will discuss these
two methods below.
Flow-based inspection: A flow can be defined as a group of
packets sharing common properties and passing an observation
point during a certain period [48]. Even if the concept of
flow is traditionally used in the IT context with TCP/IP
communications [48], Japkowicz and Taylor adapted the term
for the CAN bus [8]. In their paper, a CAN flow presents a
collection of certain characteristics such as the CAN ID and
the number of packets contained in that flow.
CAN NIDS researchers have been interested in flow-based
detection as this approach fits well CAN traffic. The majority
of ECUs in a vehicle communicate at a very specific time.
This regularity makes it easy (in theory) to create a model in
which communication patterns for each CAN ID are defined.
A flow-based NIDS would then look for deviations from these
patterns, and would raise an alert when a packet arrives too
early or too late compared to the norm.
Payload-based inspection: Payload-based NIDS focus on
the payload content of a packet. As discussed in Section
II-B, certain CAN bus attacks rely on crafting messages with
a specific payload. A car hacker can send a packet with a
specific CAN ID and a particular payload which can affect
the receiving ECUs’ behavior. If the attacker manage to send
this frame without altering the communication patterns, her
attack undetectable by flow-based NIDS.
Detecting these attacks requires to analyze the payload
of messages and compare it with either a historical model
considered to be legitimate, or with a signature of an attack.
In an anomaly-based detection approach, one can create a
normal model defining how legitimate payloads should look
like, either by learning it or using vendor’s specifications,
as we discussed in Section II-C1. Any deviation in payload
values could indicate a potential attack. One could also rely
Fig. 2: Stages in car hacking, Source: [34]
on a knowledge-based method to compare the packet’s pay-
load against signatures of known threats, either with string
matching algorithms, or by using regular expression matching
algorithm [49].
III. CHALLENGES AND THREAT ANALYSIS
In this section, we start by outlining the assumptions scop-
ing our research. For this scope we then provide a threat
analysis for the CAN bus in which we detail the capabilities
of an adversary and the attacks she can launch.
A. Assumptions
We assume that the attacker already has a foothold onto the
CAN bus of a car. Having access to CAN bus is trivial if the
attacker has physical access to the car. She could connect a
CAN device to the OBD-II port (present in modern cars to
give easy access to mechanics for maintenance operations),
and, depending on the architecture of the car [16], she could
start transmitting crafted frames. However, car makers tend
to disregard such cases and are only concerned with illegal
remote access. Researchers have already demonstrated the
feasibility of remotely compromising external interfaces [1],
[2], [4], [50].
There are several ways to obtain remote access to the CAN
bus. As explained in [34], a possible attack scenario as the
one depicted in Fig. 2 would involve the following sequence
of steps:
1) Exploitation of a vulnerability of the telematic unit over
the cellular network, granting the attacker remote code
execution capabilities and access to the CAN infotain-
ment bus.
2) Pivoting onto the network by compromising the gateway
ECU in order to gain access to the safety-critical CAN
powertrain bus.
3) Finally the attacker can inject CAN frames onto the bus
and perform diverse attacks, as described in Section II-B.
In our technical report we focus on the third step of this
scenario.
B. Threat analysis
In this section we outline the capabilities of an attacker and
specify the CAN bus attacks considered in our research.
1) Capabilities: The simplicity of the CAN protocol, as
mentioned in Section II-A, offers a number of capabilities
to an attacker once she has gained access to the network.
Because of unencrypted communication, the attacker can read
the messages out of the bus and learn about CAN IDs and
ECUs’ communication patterns in order to reverse engineer
the bus. This would allow her to pose as a legitimate ECU
by replaying or forging messages with arbitrary CAN ID
and payload. Due to the broadcast nature of the protocol,
all ECUs on the bus will receive the fake messages, and
eventually perform certain actions accordingly. By sending
crafted packets set to the specific values, an attacker can
for instance steer the car to the direction of her choice, as
demonstrated in [33]. The actions she will perform to the car
depend on her motivations and intentions.
2) Attacks: As explained in Section II-B, we consider the
following attacks:
1) Use of diagnostic messages
2) Fuzzing attack
3) Replay/spoofing attack
4) Denial of Service
To address these attacks, researchers have proposed a
number of NIDS for CAN networks which aim at detecting
injection attacks. In addition, there have been some NIDS
proposed to detect 5) suspension attacks, in which an ECU
would suddenly stop emitting its frames [11], [15]. While a
suspension of frames would actually be more a consequence
of another attack (such as a low level attack of [36]), we also
include it in our research to see whether frame level NIDS
would be able to detect a silenced ECU. In the next section
will be presented these NIDS.
IV. SURVEY OF IN-VEHICLE NIDS
A. Methodology
In this section we present the scope of our survey and
introduce the different dimensions which will be used in our
taxonomy to categorize CAN bus NIDS.
1) Paper selection / scope: For our study we consider all
NIDS approaches that perform CAN bus attack detection on a
frame level. Some approaches [11], [51]–[55], while referred
to as NIDS, actually attempt to authenticate (or fingerprint)
ECUs on the bus in order to detect illegitimate sender(s) by
using low-level signal characteristics, such as the shape of
electrical signals on the bus. Such approaches use a different
attacker model as we consider illegitimate traffic may come
from the “correct” but compromised ECU. Thus, while such
approaches are intelligent and seem promising, they would
require another dedicated survey and we exclude them from
this study.
2) Dimensions of the taxonomy: During our study we
realized that the traditional taxonomy for NIDS does not fit
very well the particularities of CAN bus NIDS. NIDS are
typically classified depending on the detection method, which
can be referred to as knowledge-based, using signatures of
attacks, or anomaly-based, looking for deviation from a sys-
tem’s model. Additionally the later method also encompasses
another variant, called specification-based detection, where
the model of the system is designed based on specifications
instead of being learned over time. While this distinction is
generally accurate in IT, CAN bus NIDS call for a different
categorization. To create a well-fitting CAN-specific NIDS
categorization, we introduce three dimensions, namely 1) the
number of frames, 2) the data used for detection, and 3) how
the detection model is built.
a) Dimension 1 - Number of frames: This dimension
refers to the amount of messages required by a NIDS to detect
an attack on the CAN bus. The approaches surveyed propose
to detect attacks with a single CAN message, two consecutive
messages, or with all the messages contained within a window.
b) Dimension 2 - Data used: A CAN bus NIDS will use
different features of CAN frames to detect attacks, such as
its arbitration ID, and/or its payload. In addition, the timing
characteristic of CAN communications can be leveraged to
detect attacks by looking at the time interval between frames.
c) Dimension 3 - Model building: CAN bus NIDS using
an anomaly-based detection approach will likely use a model
of the system to be protected and will flag deviations from
that model as attacks. There are two main ways to build such
models: either by using system’s specifications, or by learning
it over a certain period of time.
B. Survey
In this section we give an overview of the papers meeting
our study requirements and briefly describe how their proposed
system operates. We structure the following discussion based
on the first dimension.
1) Single message: A number of CAN NIDS aim at de-
tecting attacks based on a single frame. NIDSs may learn
which frames are legitimate. For example, [21] uses a deep
neural network. The model is trained based on the underlying
statistical properties of “normal and hacking CAN packets”. It
will then extract the low-dimensional features of CAN frames
to discriminate normal packets from malicious ones. Bloom
filtering techniques are used in [56] to assess the periodicity of
frames, relying on CAN IDs and certain parts of the payload.
This approach allows the detection of replay and modification
attacks. The application of four different fuzzy algorithms on
CAN payloads in [57] allows to classify CAN frames as being
normal or injected.
Instead of learning, NIDSs can rely on the specification.
A NIDS may, for example look for CAN IDs that are not
part of a specified list of legitimate IDs [58]. Abbott-McCune
and Shay propose [5] detection of illegitimate use of CAN
IDs using the fact that only one ECU may send a certain
CAN ID. By deploying on the ECUs detectors will know if
it was actually the correct one sending a given CAN frame.
Similarly a detector deployed on a gateway could detect if
CAN IDs appear on the wrong subnetwork. A disadvantage
of such a host-based approach is the need to change these
hosts. Redesigning ECUs is impractical or at least costly for
manufacturers.
Some attacks, such as replay, use messages that by them-
selves may look legitimate. Detecting these requires consider-
ing the context of the messages, e.g. by considering additional
messages.
2) Two consecutive messages: Some CAN NIDS leverage
the regularity of ECUs communications in order to detect
attacks. Recall attacks like spoofing may require sending
frames for a specific CAN ID at a much higher rate than
normal for the attack to have the desired effect. As a result,
the time interval between consecutive messages for that CAN
ID will shorten. This has been used in various papers.
Gmiden et al. [6] propose a simple intrusion detection
method for CAN network, based on the analysis of messages’
time intervals. Every time a message with a certain CAN ID
is sent onto the bus, their algorithm calculates the interval
time between this message and the previous message of the
same ID. Assuming that each CAN ID has its own regular
frequency, if the time interval calculated by the NIDS is less
than half of the expected value, an alert is raised.
Moore et al. [7] also exploit the regularity in the timing
of CAN communication. For each CAN ID, the NIDS stores
the time differences between two successive messages and
computes the mean arrival time. In addition, it will register
the maximum time difference from the mean, which will be
used to define a threshold. An alert will be raised if the time
between two packets differs from the expected time by more
than the maximum time difference plus 15% of the mean.
Otsuka and Ishigooka [9] observed that the frequency of
CAN messages may fluctuate due to collisions with other
frames. As a result, NIDS relying on naive frequency analysis
can be prone to false positives. In an attempt to improve this
method, they propose a “delayed-decision cycle detection”
method to be deployed on a gateway ECU. The idea can be
summarized as follow: each CAN ID has a certain cycle of
emission called T. If a frame is received by the gateway at
a time a, the legitimate next frame is expected at the time
a + T. In the situation where a frame with the same CAN
ID would be received before, the ECU will hold the frame
and wait until a + T. If by this time a new frame with the
same ID is received, the NIDS concludes that the previous
message received was spoofed. By holding the frame, the risk
of misdetection is reduced by not raising an alert at the first
sign of deviation.
Marchetti and Stabili [20] exploit the regularity of CAN bus
traffic in a different way by noting that CAN IDs tend to arrive
in a certain order. Their solution learns the recurring patterns
of transitions between CAN IDs within sequences of frames
and detects attacks by looking for unlikely transitions.
Attack frames will often have an illegitimate payload.
Stabili et al. [14] consider the Hamming distance between two
consecutive payloads to detect large changes in the payload.
Their NIDS learns the normal rate of change per CAN ID as a
range for the Hamming distance between successive packets’
payload. Several attacks, like fuzzing, can cause large changes
in this Hamming distance allowing them to be spotted.
Taylor et al. [15] propose an anomaly detector based on a
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) recurrent neural network
(RNN) to detect attacks. The idea is to train a neural network
to predict the next packet’s payload. Frames are considered
malicious if they deviate from the predicated value.
Even if communication is regular, fluctuations in the recep-
tion cycle may occur which can lead to false positives [9].
As attacks tend to influence frequencies for some time, con-
sidering sequences of messages may be less sensitive to such
fluctuations.
3) Messages in a window: Sequences of messages, referred
to as windows, can be formed by taking a fixed number of
messages with a given CAN ID or all messages within a fixed
amount of time (all together or again per CAN ID). NIDSs
can extract features of such windows and use them to detect
attacks.
Japkowicz et al. [8] propose a frequency-based anomaly
detector which uses time based windows per CAN ID. They
use the term flow for a windows and its features: the CAN
ID, the number of packets, the average Hamming distance
and variance of the Hamming distance between successive
packet payloads, the average time difference and its variance
between successive messages. They learn a “historical model”
using one-second sliding windows and compute t test scores
to compare new traffic to the model.
Waszecki et al. [10] note that CAN messages are not
being sent perfectly periodically but are “periodic with jitter”.
Their NIDS uses arrival curves for each message stream,
capturing the earliest and latest time each message in a window
should arrive, thus accounting for the possible jitter. Messages
arriving too late or early (or equivalently too many or too few
messages having arrived at some point in time) signals an
attack.
Lee et al. [19] describe an active approach where they query
some ECU on the bus. Variation in the response time of the
ECU may indicate that there is an attack on the bus. To detect
such variations they consider the “offset” (how many messages
occur on the bus before the response) and the “interval”
(response time). Unusual combinations of offset and interval
values are indicators of an attack.
Narayanan et al. [59] build a model based on Hidden
Markov Models capturing the normal, “safe” state of the
vehicle. For detection the NIDS maintains a state which is
updated by activities (certain CAN frames) and looks for
activities that are unlikely given the current and previous state.
Muter and Asaj [12] introduce entropy-based detection to
the area of in-vehicle networks. They describe entropy as a
“measure of how much coincidence a given dataset contains”.
They notice that automotive network traffic is regular and
much more structured than traditional IT traffic: frames are
simple, fixed format, uses values with clear bounds and
payload that follow some logic depending on the frame’s
function. With this characteristic in mind, change in entropy
could signal an attack. The NIDS from [12] thus monitors the
entropy in an automotive network.
Marchetti et al. [13] notice that the experimental evaluation
of the entropy-based NIDS of Mutter et al. is rather limited, as
it for instance only considers about 15 seconds of CAN traffic,
containing only a single class of CAN messages. In order to
evaluate the effectiveness of this approach, they implement it
and perform some experiments with various parameters and
two types of attacks, namely fuzzing and replay attacks, on
the data collected from a 2011 Ford Fiesta.
In a similar approach Wu et al. [60] also develop an entropy-
based detection method. It uses a sliding window comprised of
a fixed number of messages. Compared to the other entropy-
based systems, the authors leverage a Simulated Annealing
sliding algorithm in order to find an optimal sliding window
parameter. Additionally Wang et al. [61] propose an entropy-
based NIDS focusing on detection of entropy changes of the
CAN ID. While Muter’s approach [12] considers the CAN ID
as an inseparable vector of 11 bits, this system “analyzes the
entropy change bit by bit”.
The three categories of approaches above are designed to
detect different types of attacks. To spot all these attacks one
would have to combine different methods.
4) Combining approaches: CAN bus attacks can take dif-
ferent forms. Consequently, “using only a single algorithm is
not enough when considering the need to be able to detect
various types of malicious CAN messages” [18]. Miller and
Valasek [16] implement such a hybrid NIDS. They note that all
known CAN injection attacks rely on either CAN diagnostic
messages or standard messages sent at higher rates. To detect
these attacks they design a NIDS with two detection modules.
The first module looks for diagnostic messages while driving.
The second one focuses on the frequency of CAN messages.
A similar NIDS has been proposed by Song et al. in their
paper [17]. They do not discuss the knowledge part in depth,
beside mentioning that diagnostic messages should not being
seen on the bus while driving (obvious sign of attack). Regard-
ing the behavior module, they also select the message rate as
a significant feature like described in the previous paragraph.
The NIDS monitors the time interval of messages, and if
an interval between two consecutive packets is shorter than
normal, it considers the message to be maliciously injected.
Ujiie et al. [18] propose to combine learning white lists
of normal CAN IDs and payload with algorithms to look
for cyclic CAN messages sent outside of normal cycles, non-
cyclic messages sent at an abnormal frequency, or messages
otherwise not matching learned historical statistical properties.
In [62] the authors derive from models of behavior a set
of attacks based on a list of forbidden sequences. Their
system then checks whether a frame is compliant with the
specifications and is consistent with the current state of the
system.
The text above discusses NIDS and the influence of
“number-of-frames”-dimension. Below we also consider the
effect of the other dimensions.
C. Discussion
As seen above the number of frames used has implications
on the types of attacks that can be found. The data used
also impacts types of detectable attacks. How models are built
influences how easy this process is and how much information
it needs. All dimensions also impacts the accuracy of the
NIDS.
Time interval between messages: As discussed in the pre-
vious section, certain NIDS leverage the regularity of CAN
communications in order to determine whether the flow of
messages is legitimate or not. Such approaches make sense
under the assumption that all CAN frames will be sent at a
fixed period.
CAN ID: In the case of attacks relying on using specific
CAN ID such as fuzzing attacks, NIDS similar to [11] focus
on the CAN ID of a frame to assert its maliciousness. The
NIDS leveraging the CAN ID of a frame to detect attacks are
usually performing analysis of single message, as presented in
the previous section.
Payload: Another class of NIDS look at the content of a
frame’s payload for abnormal values. In traditional IT NIDS,
this approach is often referred as deep packet inspection, as it
analyses the payload instead of solely relying on the header’s
information to detect attacks. Different CAN bus NIDS have
been published, for example [14].
Specified: Build a reference model can be done by manually
specifying the communication pattern, according to the ven-
dors’ specifications. The model is guaranteed to be complete
and exhaustive enough so that the chances of having false
positive is drastically reduced [47]. As first proposed by
Larson et al. in [22], this technique could greatly enhance
the detection capabilities of NIDS, but it is unfortunately not
trivial to obtain such specifications from manufacturers. They
are often reluctant to disclose them and keep this information
confidential.
Learned: As specifications for cars are difficult to obtain,
most CAN NIDS try to built their models during a learning
phase. Over a period of time, the NIDS will observe the
traffic and will derive communication patterns. The challenge
with this approach is to make sure that the learning phase
encompasses a broad range of situations to guarantee that the
model built is as close as possible to the reality. When failing
to do so, it increases the risks of false positives.
Further considerations: While out of scope for this survey,
appropriate response to detected attacks is also an important
issue that needs to be addressed when considering practical
deployment of CAN NIDS. It is not trivial to choose a “safe”
response to a possible attack and only a few possible options
are mentioned in the surveyed papers. Abbott-McCune and
Shay [5] propose blocking of a malicious message by sending
several dominant bits on the bus which will cause an error and
invalidate the message. Miller and Valasek [16] suggest short
circuiting the CAN bus when spotting an attack. This would
result in putting the car into “limp mode”, so the driver could
safely stop the car.
TABLE I: Inventory of proposed CAN NIDs
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[21] Ë Ë Ë Ë
[56] Ë Ë Ë Ë
[57] Ë Ë Ë
[58] Ë Ë Ë ○
[5] Ë Ë Ë
[6] Ë Ë Ë Ë
[7] Ë Ë Ë
[9] Ë Ë Ë
[20] Ë Ë Ë
[14] Ë Ë Ë
[15] Ë Ë Ë Ë
[8] Ë Ë Ë
[10] Ë Ë Ë
[19] Ë Ë
[59] Ë Ë Ë
[12] Ë Ë Ë Ë
[13] Ë Ë Ë Ë
[60] Ë Ë Ë
[61] Ë Ë Ë
[16] Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
[17] Ë Ë Ë Ë - -
[18] Ë ○ Ë Ë Ë Ë
[62] Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë
[63] - - - Ë Ë Ë Ë
Ë Explicitly mentioned in paper ○ Implicitly mentioned in paper
- Unclear/not mentioned at all
V. CONCLUSION
This technical report surveys existing CAN NIDS ap-
proaches proposed in the literature. We categorize them based
on the information they use and the way the model is con-
structed. However one does not know how do these systems
perform. In future work we will investigate how to compare
the NIDS from one another. Doing so will require a unifying
testing framework.
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